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Wilson: Law and Precedent

Law and Precedent
ARTHUR JESS WuLsox

Tradition is the lifeblood of the law. A thorough familiarity with the history of the law must precede a scholarly
understanding of its machinery. Those who decry "A Government of the Living by the Dead" forget that ideas are immortal. Social and economic necessity continue to mold and
to modify the legal substance, but the actual materiality of that
substance is rooted in historical precedent and is, strictly
speaking, for all time unchangeable. A conscious law-making
people will do everything within their power to apply the law
according to an interpretation which will best suit the needs of
their immediate code of civilization. Yet the law remains like
the ball of mercury, pressed into a thousand shapes, but still
retaining the essential marks of its original identity.1
Or, perhaps, using a chemical analogy we might say that
the law is a catalytic agent whose function it is to accelerate
or to retard social change without ever undergoing any permanent material change in itself. An excellent example of this is
the traditional significance of the seal as a presumption of
consideration. The original importance of the seal resulted
from the fact that the placing of the seal upon a document
was accompanied by certain ceremonial conduct. The hot wax
was applied with dignity and consumed enough time to raise
the presumption that the contracting parties carefully considered their contractual conduct. Parallel with historical
progress appeared advanced commercial methods so that the
ceremonial affixing of the seal became a lost practice devoid
of present practical application. The importance of the seal
*Administrative Assistant, Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation, New
York State Education Department; author of A Guide to the Genius
of Cardozo.
'There is no better example of this than the gradual legal emancipation
of women. At common law the husband and wife were considered as
a single person. Such a theory created many inconveniences. Neither
could make a contract with the other. Neither could commit a tort
upon the other. Reform legislation began to modify the common law
disabilities of married women. A married woman can today sue her
husband or any other person for a property tort. A married woman
today may freely contract with any person, including her husband.
However, the enabling statutes today fail to abolish the common law
theory entirely. Under the New York statutes, a woman cannot sue
her husband in tort for assault and battery; nor for malicious prosecution; nor can they steal from one another; nor can they be guilty
of conspiracy.
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has thus been gradually diminished, so that in many jurisdictions the essential differences between sealed and unsealed
instruments have been abolished. In the State of New York
today a seal upon'an instrument is neither conclusive nor presumptive evidence of consideration. We see, then, that an intelligently advanced people completely modified a strongly
entrenched traditional principle in the law of contracts to meet
the requirements of a modern commercial society.
However, it is also worthy of our notice that certain importance still clings to the sealed instrument. A sealed instrument is of a higher nature than an informal written contract
or one not under seal.' In New York a right of action on informal contracts is barred if it is not brought within six years
after such action accrues. A longer period, twenty years, prevails with sealed instruments." To render a sealed instrument
operative, it must be delivered and accepted.'
Here we have viewed the gradual sequence of traditional law
to the degree of modification but not obliteration. It is true that
the substantial importance of the seal in the law of contracts
has been abolished, but the materiality of the traditional significance of the seal is still zealously guarded. This has been
the fate of almost all the law.
The dead past continues to govern, but each generation
gives new youth to the law either by its own interpretation or
by statutory change. Our own nation inherited the firmly entrenched principles of the English common law, and yet, within
the lifetime of our judiciary, the courts on more than one
occasion have found opportunity to point out that social and
cultural transition amongst our people demanded doctrinal
digression. Typically, without hesitation, the courts have so
commented.
"It cannot be necessary to cite cases to prove that
those portions of the common law of England which are
hostile to the spirit of our institutions, or which are not
adapted to the existing state of things in this country, form
no part of our law.""
Justice Cardozo, with magnificent subtlety, manipulated
the legal putty to fill the mold. He rendered the opinions of the
court in two tort cases that were thoroughly antagonistic upon
the surface, so that the essence of the two decisions became har'Schoonmaker v. Hoyt (1896) 148 N. Y. 425, 42 N. E. 1059.
3CIvIL
PRACTICE ACT, §§47 and 48.
'King v. Fragley (1912) 19 Cal. App. 735, 127 P. 813.
'Parker & Edgarton v. Foote (1838) 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309.
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moniously reconcilable by virtue of their individual adaptation
to the peculiar circumstances of each case. In MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Company' he said bluntly:
"Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage
coach do not fit the conditions of today."
But with more pliable conditions the distinguished Justice was
unwilling to discard traditional precedent. In Matter of Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corporation'he was the scholarly jurist
speaking. This was an appeal from an order of the Appellate
Division which affirmed an award of the State Industrial
Board made under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Babington, employed as a chauffeur by the Yellow Taxi Corporation, was ordered by a police officer to pursue another car and
thereby met his death through accident. Under such state of
facts the question arose as to whether Babington was killed in
the course of his employment. Discussing the obligation of a
citizen to aid an officer in arresting a suspect, Justice Cardozo
commented:
"The duty goes back to the days of the hue and cry."
He then cites as a typical illustration the Statute of Winchester,
13 Edw. I, enacted in 1258, wherein it was stated that every
man shall have "in his house Harness for to keep the Peace
after the antient Assise."
Developing his argument, he
continues:
"The horse has yielded to the motor car as an instrument of pursuit and flight. The ancient ordinance abides
as an interpreter of present duty. Still as in the days of
Edward I, the Citizenry may be called upon to enforce the
justice of the State . . . with whatever implements and
facilities are convenient and at hand."
Is not this enough to make it appear that the law is a vast
fabric of relevancy in which the synchronization of legal principles creates a composite functioning mechanism whose source
of energy is traditional?
During the time intervening between the two foregoing
decisions, the scholarly Justice delivered a series of lectures
at the Yale Law School in which he emphatically stated to the
students:
6(1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440, L. R. A.
1916F 696.
T(1928) 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726.
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"Nothing can take the place of rigorous and accurate
and profound study of the law as already developed by the
wisdom of the past. This is the raw material which we are
to mould."'
The beauty of the law is apparent only to those who have
the vision which enables them to view its substance in its entire
composition.! Isolate a single judicial principle from the legal
machinery and thus, standing alone and indifferent to the
traditional pattern, the principle becomes inorganic. The law
of itself is a huge structure; justice becomes its function. The
important fact in this connection is that this legal structure
is thoroughly a traditional structure, erected by time through
the experience of men, and to this extent the law is an inheritance." However, all of that inheritance has not been beneficial
and so each generation takes from the past what it can mold
to its own pattern and rejects that which it cannot use.
Our
American system of law has so handled the common law of
England. Said Justice Story:
"The common law of England is not to be taken in all
respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with
them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that
portion which was applicable to their situation.'
'Cardozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, p. 60 (Yale U. Press, New Haven,
1927.) These lectures were given in December, 1923, supplementing
those given in 1921.
" ..... it is one of the chief beauties of our system of jurisprudence
that it is flexible, and opens to take in all meritorious cases and give
a remedy." Wade v. Malloy (1878) 16 Hun. (N. Y.) 226.
"This is known as the doctrine of stare deci/is: "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases. It is a general maxim that when a point has
been settled by decision it forms a precedent which is not afterwards
to be departed from."
The following opinion is a concrete defense of stare decisis: "The
question is again presented whether we shall adhere to the former decisions of this court, or overrule them. The propriety and justice of
the doctrine of stare ecis is stated with great force and marked
ability by this court in the case of Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 469,
where it is said: 'The question at the threshold is, whether a rule
of property thus repeatedly declared by the court of last resort after
earnest contest, and, It must be supposed, upon the most careful
deliberation, should be deemed open to further controversy. The repose
of titles is important to the public. Upon the faith of these decisions
our people have, for a considerable period of years, invested their
money in real estate, the titles to which they were thus again and
again assured were not liable to be disturbed. There must be a just
basis of confidence in the stability of judicial decision, somewhere
in the history of a controverted legal question, when it may be confidently relied on that the question is settled .. '" Carver v. Louthain (1872) 38 Ind. 530, 538.
uVan Ness v. Pacard (1829) 2 Peters (U. S.) 137, 7 L. Ed. 374.
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In spite of such select inheritance, the layman persists in
asking: Why should I be governed by an inheritance that was
applied hundreds of years ago to conditions that were so different from those which exist today?
The reason is substantial. The primary concern of the law
is with the behavior of individuals so as to insure an orderly
social organization. In the light of this concern, the layman
must never forget that since the first formation of men into
a society, over all those hundreds of years until the present
moment, the requirements for individual behavior so as to
insure social order have never changed. It is true that civilization has left a trail of complications, but as pointed out
previously, that is why certain traditional legal concepts are
constantly being modified but seldom being obliterated. In the
words of Justice Cardozo we might say at least that "decisions
are helpful" to mark a "direction and a tendency.''
This is
what he meant by the "wisdom of the past."
But before we leave the contemplation of legal tradition
there is one more step necessary to insure the impregnability of
our proposition. The lawyer must constantly guard against the
insinuation that his method of reasoning is sui generis. There
are those who would baptize the legal brain-child with a name
unknown to any other academic family. With due recognition
of such skepticism I must resort to the realm of impartial and
abstract thought known by classification as Philosophy, for
which system of thought the scientific student has an undue
reverence.
"There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it will not be a
study of philosophy but a study, by means of philosophy,
of life-experience. But this experience is already overlaid
and saturated with the products of the reflection of past
generations and bygone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, due to sophisticated thought, which
have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh,
naive empirical material. It would take more wisdom than
is possessed by the wisest historic scholar to track all of
these absorbed borrowings to their sources. If we may for
the moment call these materials prejudices (even if they
are true, as long as their source and authority is unknown),
"Varriale v. Brooklyn Edison Co. (1929) 252 N. Y. 222, 169 N. E. 284.
Or as was said by Justice Martin in Peck v. Schenectady Ry. Co.
(1902) 170 N. Y. 298, 63 N. E. 357, " . . . . notwithstanding the fact
that many jurisdictions have held a contrary doctrine, still a principle which has been so thoroughly ingrafted upon the law of our own
jurisprudence should not be lightly disregarded."
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then philosophy is a critique of prejudices. These incorporated results of past reflection, welded into the genuine
materials of first-hand experience, may become organs of
enrichment if they are detected and reflected upon. If they
are not detected, they often obfuscate and distort. Clarification and emancipation follow when they are detected and
cast out; and one great object of philosophy is to accomplish this task.""
Thus John Dewey, in his profound volume on Experience and
Nature, 1 commits himself upon the value of tradition to the law
as described in the decisions of Mr. Justice Cardozo.
There is a value to experience which has a superiority
over every other form of knowledge. For experience is proof.
The procedure and substance of the law are a residue, not the
corpus. Therefore the emphasis on history. It is a liberal viewpoint, although many have taken the opposite and mistaken
viewpoint. One cannot trace the lost river by analyzing a
specimen of its water, but only by examining the direction of
its bed. In the same manner one will never determine the development of the law by examining legal specimens but only
by searching for its historical bed through which it flows and
by which its course is determined. When an insistent voice says:
"Let us analyze the problem my way," the judiciary may
answer with the voice of authority: "History forbids this construction. "' In some cases, "the historical prop failing, the
prop or fancied prop of principle remains.""
The layman fails to perceive the picture as a whole. The
court answers his general attack in Bergman v. Scottish Union
& Nat. Ins. Co. :1"
"Popular notions of the administration of justice may
approve any judgment which is considered right, irrespective of the methods by which it was obtained. Experience
has taught us, however, that without forms and regulated
procedure chaos and confusion soon develop and evils arise
which make summary and hasty dispositions more unfair
and unjust than the slow but sure methods of the law."
ultalics are mine.
p. 37.
"Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Society (1909) 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E.
443, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 420.
'Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 580, 81 L. Ed.
1278, 57 S. C. 883, 109 A. L. R. 1293.
" (1934) 264 N. Y. 205, 190 N. E. 409.
24(1929)
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Mr. Justice Brandeis stated,'
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled than that it be settled right ... The Court
bows to the lessons of experience . . . recognizing that the

process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical
sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function .
To which one might add that,
"The importance of observing the spirit of this rule
cannot be overestimated, for, while justice in a given case
may be worked out by a decision of the court according to
the notions of right which govern the individual judge or
body of judges comprising the court, the mischief which
will finally result may be almost incalculable under our
system, which makes a decision in one case a precedent for
decisions in all future cases which are akin to it in the essential facts."'

A close study of the philosophy of precedent will lead to
three attitudes on the part of the judiciary.
The first is that,
"It is better to adhere to established general rules than
to attempt to work out equity in exceptional cases.'
The second is that
"No inflexible rule can be laid down. Each case must
in a measure be a law unto itself." '
The third takes the middle road, that
"While that fact (precedent) may not be conclusive
upon the question, it is entitled to weight

. . .

The latter attitude represents the utmost in liberality in regard
to the doctrine of stare decisis, and is an attitude that is often
followed. Usually the court will be blunt and say, for instance,
very tersely that
"Whatever line of attack on legislative power is taken,
the assault is turned back by numerous decisions on the
subject.'"
"Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. (1932) 285 U. S. 393, 52 S. C. 443,
76 L. Ed. 815.
"'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (1902) 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
442, 59 L. R. A. 478, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828.
"Clark v. Sickler (1876) 64 N. Y. 231, 21 Am. Rep. 606.
'Fischer v. Blank (1893) 138 N. Y. 244, 33 N. E. 1040.
mConrad v. Conrad (1908) 124 App. Div. 780, 109 N. Y. S. 387.
"In re Morse (1928) 247 N. Y. 290, 160 N. E. 374.
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The situations of life do not change. Man does not change.
It is neither life nor man that changes, but man's discovery of
life that changes, and this leads to the inadequacy of former
law. Even when changes appear, the court has been reluctant
to say:
"However, without attempting to justify this distinction as logical or reasonable in most cases, we nevertheless are forced to realize that as the result of inheritance
and frequent repetition the rule has become too firmly
established to be disregarded.' "
The judiciary has never claimed to seek thoroughly abstract
decisions but constantly admits that a certain opinion is not
even a matter of pure logic "but rests more upon authority
and precedent than reason."

Let not the layman abhor this

condition. Behind the vulnerability of a human judge's mind,
but before the defendant, invisibly stands the wisdom of the
ages.
"Wrlght v. Wright (1919) 225 N. Y. 329, 122 N. E. 213.
'Vanderzee v. Slingerland (1886) 103 N. Y. 47, 8 N. E. 247, 57 Am.
Rep. 701.
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